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Summary – Many tropical countries have recently implemented similar forest policies including 
large-scale afforestation programmes and the devolution of land-use rights. Their success in 
enhancing livelihoods and contributing to improved environmental services has been widely 
questioned. This paper discusses the impacts of state afforestation efforts and forestry land allocation 
on farmers’ land-use decisions in northern Vietnam. It links policy outcomes with factors located 
beyond the local level by analysing the decision-making process at the policy implementation stage. 
Our study suggests that the current national afforestation campaign has not successfully involved 
households in the forestry sector and that forestry land allocation to households has often disrupted 
existing land-use systems with little impact on afforestation. These discrepancies between policy 
intentions and outcomes are partly linked to the relative freedom provinces have to interpret and adapt 
policies during the implementation stage. In this respect, the political and economic context has 
played a significant role in providing particular financial and bureaucratic incentives to the former 
State Forest Enterprises and to civil servants. However, we argue that these actors have been allowed 
or even encouraged to take advantage of these incentives by national policy-makers thanks to: 1) the 
lack of clarity or the poor adequacy of the policies designed at the central level, and 2) the blurred 
character of prevailing national discourses promoting afforestation and community-based forest 
management. We recommend that national policy-makers allow flexibility in policy implementation 
but develop mechanisms of accountability and control between the provincial and the central 
authorities. 
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1) Introduction 
For the last decade, there has been a pattern of similar forest policies in tropical countries, 
embodied in afforestation campaigns and in the decentralisation of forest and land management. 
Championed and supported by international funding agencies and Non Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs), these policies have often been considered as a positive move towards environmentally-
sound, equitable and participatory approaches to natural resources management. Yet, the success of 
these afforestation efforts in contributing to environmental protection and in improving livelihoods 
has been challenged (Toma et al., 2004; Weyerhaeuser et al., 2005). The implementation of 
decentralised forms of forest management, namely Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM), 
has also often failed to lead to more effective and equitable management and to achieve its pro-poor 
objectives (Blaikie, 2006; Ribot et al., 2006). Indeed, in the field of forest policy, there has often been 
a gap between the rhetoric, intentions, and the observed results in the field (Blaikie and Springate-
Baginski, 2007).  
Using the case study of northern Vietnam, this paper explores precisely that gap between policy 
intentions and outcomes. Our analysis focuses on the implementation of two policy decisions – the 
current national afforestation programme called the Five Million Hectare Reforestation Programme 
(5MHRP), and the allocation of property rights for forestry land2 to households and communities –
and on their impact on farmers’ land-use decisions. These policies are particularly important in 
Vietnam because of their large spatial and temporal extent: they have been implemented in every 
administrative unit and have undergone an average 10-year implementation phase. They are also 
significant in that they have incurred high costs for the state budget, and have been expected to 
greatly improve both people’s livelihoods and the environment. Whereas many studies have 
documented the impact of forestry land allocation (FLA) on forest and land management at the local 
level (Dinh Duc Thuan, 2005; Castella et al., 2006; Tran Ngoc Thanh and Sikor, 2006; Jakobsen et 
al., 2007; Sikor and Tran Ngoc Thanh, 2007), few attempts have been made to identify and analyse 
drivers affecting final policy outcomes beyond the local level. In addition, very few information is 
available on the results of the 5MHRP, considered to be one of the cornerstones of the national 
forestry policy, and its impacts on farmers’ decisions.  
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 Forestry land is one of the six land categories as defined by the State in Vietnam. Forestry land is defined 
in the 1991 Forest Protection and Development (FPD) Law as: i) “Land of forest cover”; and ii) “Land of no 
forest cover, planned for afforestation, hereinafter called afforestation land. The term “forest land” has been 
generally used to designate this category in English. We prefer however using “forestry land” which literally 
corresponds to the Vietnamese term “ñất lâm nghiệp”. The term “forest land” may be confusing as it suggests 
that the designated land has an existing forest cover. 
We adopted a multi-scale and interdisciplinary framework rooted in institutional analysis and 
political ecology, which allows the simultaneous examination of the influence of institutions, 
discourses, and the politico-economic context on actors’ decisions. Our analysis is based on: i) the 
results of a previous local level study of the afforestation process observed in three villages of 
northern Vietnam (Clement and Amezaga, 2008); ii) interviews with civil servants of the provincial 
state departments in four northern provinces and with different actors interacting with policy-makers 
at the national level, and; iii) secondary data including provincial reports on the results of forestry 
land allocation (FLA) and the 5MHRP. 
This paper starts by presenting the framework and methodology for data collection and analysis. 
The next section gives an account of the institutional, political and economic context of the forest 
policy-making arena3 in Vietnam. It then briefly reviews the general features of the impacts of the 
5MHRP and FLA at the local level and links observed policy outcomes with the decisions taken by 
policy-makers during the implementation stage. Findings suggest that forest policies have not resulted 
in the stated objectives because: (1) the rules designed at the central level lack clarity, which has 
allowed influential actors to interpret and implement policies according to their interests; (2) blurred 
discourses have generally further facilitated the arbitrary implementation of unclear rules. 
2) Method and study sites 
(a) A framework for analysis 
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed in the 1980s by Elinor 
Ostrom and her colleagues (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982) provides a useful means to assess the causes of 
policy gaps as it links multiple governance levels, namely (i) the operational level where decisions 
made directly affect resources management; (ii) the collective-choice level where decisions made 
affect the rules-in-use at the operational level, and; (iii) the constitutional level where decisions made 
affect who decides and how decisions are made in the collective-choice arena (Ostrom, 1999). 
Institutions are considered in this study as “the prescriptions that humans use to organise all forms of 
repetitive and structured interactions” (Ostrom, 2005). They thus refer to the “rules of the game” 
(North, 1990, p. 3) and are distinguished from organisations, which are seen as the “players” of the 
game who will use the rules in such a way as to win the game (ibid.). Institutions do not only 
encompass written legal documents but also for instance informal rules which have been orally agreed 
upon. As shown in the overall framework we used for our studies of forest policies in Vietnam 
(Figure 1), the institutional levels of the IAD framework do not necessarily correspond to 
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 The forest arena refers here to the action arena in which actors participating in forest management interact 
with different action situations, at all decision-making levels. 
administrative levels. For instance, local communities4 can also operate at the collective-choice or 
even at the constitutional levels when crafting their own rules or deciding on rule crafting modalities.  
Institutional analysis is particularly pertinent because the recent changes in the forest policy-
making arena in Vietnam have significantly impacted the set of actors and rules governing land access 
and land use. Our previous study at the village level indicated that the changes in the local rules 
resulting from national policies had been an important driver in farmers’ land-use decisions (Clement 
and Amezaga, 2008). FLA has unambiguously impacted on institutions by fixing new rules of land 
ownership, access and use. In addition to introducing explicit institutional components5, the 5MHRP 
relies for its execution on the establishment or enforcement of existing rules on land classification, 
land ownership and land use.  
 
Figure 1. Overall framework used for our series of forest policy studies, adapted from the IAD 
framework (Ostrom, 1999)  
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 There is no universally shared concept of community. In a generic sense, it is usually understood as a small 
spatial unit with a distinct social structure and a shared set of norms (Agrawal and Gibson, 2001). As Agrawal 
and Gibson (ibid) argue, we believe it is more fruitful to examine the role of institutions rather than 
“community”. We use the term “local community” in this paper to refer to a village or group of households. In 
the IAD framework, we used the term “policy community” to refer to the group of participants who take policy 
decisions. 
5
 E.g. the 5MHRP introduces the benefit sharing principle which for example permits the households who 
were contracted for forest protection to collect all forest products from thinning. The duty and benefit of 
households who had been allocated land-use rights were further specified under Decision No. 178/2001/QD-
TTg. 
Although one major asset of the IAD framework is to link several institutional levels, its use in the 
field of natural resources management has often been restricted to the operational level. We argue that 
the IAD would gain analytical power in the study of environmental policy process by introducing 
some theoretical concepts used in political ecology. Originally rooted in a materialist approach 
investigating the influence of state and society on the exploitation of natural resources (Blaikie, 
1985), political ecology has broadly aimed to link ecological change with political economy (Blaikie 
and Brookfield, 1987).  Within the various strands that have developed under this research field, the 
poststructuralist perspective has notably provided fresh insights on the social construction of 
environmental processes by analysing the historical evolution of environmental discourses (Escobar, 
1996). We have integrated elements of both the materialist and constructivist analysis in our 
approach, ontologically rooted in critical realism6. 
Accordingly, we added two exogenous variables to the original IAD framework (Figure 2). First, 
we extended the external variables to contextual factors (cf. Edwards and Steins, 1999), and in 
particular to the politico-economic context. As argued by Ribot (2006), the IAD framework does not 
explicitly bring power issues to the fore. In the framework, power relationships are framed by and, to 
some extent, encapsulated within institutions. It is necessary to understand how power is distributed, 
how political and economic interests drive actors’ decisions within a particular set of rules. Then 
institutional analysis will inform us on how this current set of rules-in-use designed at one level has 
affected power distribution and what institutional change can lead to more equitable and efficient 
outcomes. Second, we stressed the role of discourses in the way they shape values, norms and 
preferences, and position actors (Hajer, 1995). By discourses, we mean  “a specific ensemble of ideas, 
concepts, and categorisations that is produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of 
practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995, p. 60). 
Discourse analysis is not contradictory with institutional analysis (Hajer, 1995). Discourses are linked 
to institutions not only in how discourses affect institutions but also in how discourses have emerged 
in a particular institutional and politico-economic context. By following this poststructuralist stance of 
political ecology, we aim to “assess the political construction of what is considered to be ecological” 
(Forsyth, 2001, p. 147). In addition, we highlighted the role of beliefs in the internal valuation 
mechanism that actors use to make decisions. Indeed, a common theme for the failures of community-
based management (CBM) of natural resources is the misconceived beliefs that policy-makers have 
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 Critical realism and institutional analysis are compatible in several ways. They have congruent approaches 
regarding: 1) structure and agency – both distinguish structure and agency while acknowledging their 
interdependency, and; 2) the model of the actor behaviour. Although the latter is originally rooted in rational 
choice theory in the IAD framework, E. Ostrom proposes to extend the model of rational choice to bounded 
rationality where actors do not only follow their self-interest but also norms and values (Ostrom, 1998) 
 
about the capacity of local users to manage natural resources sustainably and on aspects of the natural 
resources themselves (e.g. their oversimplification of environmental systems) (Nunan, 2006; Wong et 
al., 2007).  
 
 
Figure 2. Revised IAD framework for the study of the collective-choice and constitutional levels 
 
Our overall analytical framework (Figure 1) is broad because it has been used for a larger piece of 
research investigating forestry policies at several institutional levels. However, as the IAD, it can be 
unpacked in different ways depending on the perspective considered to be the most relevant and 
illuminating. For instance at the local level, a special attention was given to the rules-in-use for land 
management. In this paper, we will particularly focus on the role of the rules-in-use and discourses. 
The framework we adopted (Figure 2) has been used as a way of structuring the analysis and 
providing a menu of questions to be considered: which incentives and beliefs have driven actors’ 
decisions; and how the past and current institutions, politico-economic contexts and discourses have 
shaped these incentives and beliefs.  
(b) The case study area and data collection 
The focus of this study is limited to the northern uplands of Vietnam. Data have been collected 
through semi-structured interviews with civil servants at the provincial and central level, NGOs, 
donors, and researchers in Hanoi and in four northern provinces: Hoa Binh, Son La, Thai Nguyen and 
Yen Bai (Figure 3).  
  Figure 3. Location of fieldwork in North Vietnam 
 
The provinces were selected according to fieldwork feasibility but also in order to constitute a 
representative sample of the Vietnam northern region regarding socio-economic (distance to Hanoi, 
population density, importance of the forestry sector), environmental (area of land classified as 
forestry land), and political (progress in FLA implementation) variables. These characteristics are 
presented in Table 1 for each province. This is not an extensive list of all significant variables and 
data aggregated at the provincial level hide large inter-district variability, but they will give to the 
reader non familiar with the northern region a grasp of the socio-economic, environmental and 
political context in the four provinces.  
 
Table 1. Characteristics of the visited provinces (2006 figures) 
Provinces Hoa Binh Son La Thai Nguyen Yen Bai 
Total areaa (km2) 4662.5 14055.0 3543.5 6887.8 
Population densityb (person/km2) 174.0 70.0 313.0 106.0 
Distance from the provincial capital to Hanoi (km) 76.0 308.0 80.0 183.0 
Forest covera (%) 44.2 41.1 46.5 54.7 
Percentage of land classified as forestlanda (%) 69.9 65.6 50.0 76.7 
Output value of forestry at constant 1994 pricesb 
(billion Vietnam Dongs (VND)) 
193.6 231.1 67.5 332.7 
% of forestland allocatedc 92.9 99.8 82.3 99.5 
% of forestland allocated to communities, villages and 
Commune People’s Committeesc 
11.5 49.1 4.2 24.7 
% of forestland allocated or contracted to householdsc 74.9 17.5 47.0 62.0 
 Sources:  
a. Forest Protection Department website, (only available in Vietnamese), 
http://www.kiemlam.org.vn/Desktop.aspx/News/So-lieu-dien-bien-rung-hang-nam/Nam_2006, last accessed in 
March 2008 
b. General Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam website, http://www.gso.gov.vn, last accessed in Feb 2007 
c. 2006 reports on land allocation from Forest Protection Departments of the visited provinces 
 
 
Visits in the provinces consisted of two-hour semi-structured interviews with senior officials from 
the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) and/or the Forestry sub-Department 
(FD) and the Forest Protection Department (FPD) in the four provinces, the Department of Natural 
Resources and Environment (DONRE) in two provinces and the Forest Science Institute of Vietnam 
in Son La. In total, 12 organisations and 21 persons were interviewed. Implementation at the district 
level has not been investigated in detail in the present study due to time and capacity constraints. It 
nonetheless might play an important role as, with the commune authorities, the district state bodies act 
as the policy implementers on the ground and hold de facto relative freedom for adapting and 
negotiating policies with local people (Kerkvliet, 2004). Furthermore, we will not develop in the 
present paper the role of other potential influential actors such as donors and NGOs but will focus on 
the action and decision of the provincial state organisations that act as policy implementers.  
At the national level, 36 semi-structured interviews of one hour were conducted with foreign and 
national researchers, donors, international and national NGOs, consultants and civil servants. The 
interviews focused on the organisation’s activities, networks and links with other actors (particularly 
policy-makers), on the driving forces for recent policy changes, and explored the beliefs related to 
forest and land degradation. Lastly, we also used the findings from a previous local level study 
analysing the drivers for afforestation in three villages of Hoa Binh Province (Clement and Amezaga, 
2008). Fieldwork for this study involved 80 semi-structured interviews with farmers and commune 
authorities. 
3) The Setting: the forest arena in Vietnam  
(a) The legal context 
The forestry sector and forest protection in Vietnam have been subject to many political, economic 
and legal changes over the last two decades. Forestry land and forest resources management have 
been defined and revised in more than 100 laws and regulations (an exhaustive list is given on 
VietnamNet INCOM, 2007). These recent changes have significantly impacted on the set of actors 
and rules governing land access and land use.  
The legal decisions that have particularly affected the forest arena include: (1) land classification 
and the rules for forest protection defined in the Law on Forest Protection and Development in 1991 
and 2004 (National Assembly of Vietnam, 1991, 2004); (2) the devolution of land-use rights to 
private organisations and households notably through the 1993 Land Law, decrees 02/CP in 1994 and 
163/1999 in 1999; (3) the recognition of communities as legal recipients for forestry land-use rights in 
2004 (National Assembly of Vietnam, 2004); (4) afforestation programmes (Programmes 327, 556 
and 5MHRP) and; (5) the reform of State Forest Enterprises (SFEs) (Decision 187/QD-TTg). These 
policy decisions are only the visible manifestations of a much broader political system and the on-
going process of policy change. They are nevertheless major “mobilisation factors” in the policy 
process because they provide the official basis of rights and responsibilities for provincial authorities, 
as well as a source of funding for provincial action.  
Forestry land allocation (FLA) (embodied in decisions (2) and (3) above) has directly impacted on 
local institutions by fixing new rules of land ownership, access and use. Long-term land-use rights 
have been devolved to individuals and households, and state organisations. Communities (e.g. groups 
of households and villages) were recognised as legal recipients of land-use rights only since the 
revision of the Land Law in 2003 and the Law of Forest Protection and Development in 2004. In 
practice, allocation to communities has been very limited, often restricted to pilot studies supported 
by donors and NGOs. Generally, FLA has followed a much slower implementation pace than 
agricultural land allocation, especially in the region of the Central Highlands. Sunderlin and Huynh 
(2005) report that, although 61 per cent of the land has been allocated, only 10 per cent has been 
actually allocated to households and communities. According to the 2006 figures from the Forest 
Protection Department (www.kiemlam.org.vn), households own use rights to 24 per cent of forestry 
land.  
Following the Law on Forest Protection and Development (1991), forest and forestry land have 
been classified into three categories according to their intended uses:  
1) special-use forest with an intended use for nature conservation (biodiversity preservation) 
and landscape protection (including historical and cultural heritage);  
2) protection forest with an intended use for water resources and soil protection; and,  
3) production forest with an intended use for commercial activities: exploitation of timber or 
non-timber forest products (NTFPs).  
The definition of forestry land does not necessarily mean the presence of forest cover. Production 
forestry land can be covered by natural forest and special-use forestry land can be much degraded 
with a very poor forest cover. Forest and land classification has implications for land management 
(e.g. special-use forest is managed by the State but production forest can be allocated to private 
organisations and individuals), and determines the rights and responsibilities of all state and private 
land-use rights recipients over land use. 
National afforestation programmes started in northern Vietnam in the mid 1950s (De Jong et al., 
2006). The afforestation effort has been particularly strengthened since the 1990s, with two major 
state initiatives, called “Greening the Barren Hills Programme” (or Programme 327) and the Five 
Million Hectare Reforestation Programme (5MHRP). The 5MHRP (also called Programme 661 from 
the name of the Decision 661/QD-TTg) replaced Programme 327 in 1998. It is now running until 
2010 in its third and last stage. Although the 5MHRP encompasses social and economic goals, the 
first primary goal stated in the Decision 661 is environmental (Prime Minister of the Government of 
Vietnam, 1998) : “to increase the forest cover to 43% of the national territory, protect the 
environment, decrease the severity of natural disasters, increase water availability (…), protect 
biodiversity.” The objectives are to protect existing forest and to plant 5 million hectares (ha) of 
forest, including 2 million ha of protection and special-use forest. Notably, the state investment funds 
allocated to the 5MHRP are almost7 exclusively directed to establishment and conservation of 
protection and special-use forest (Prime Minister of the Government of Vietnam, 1999). Plantation of 
production forest is subsidised through a loan scheme, the Development Support Fund which was 
established to provide concessionary loans to priority activities defined by the government. 
There have been substantial discrepancies among provinces in the way forest policies have been 
implemented. This is related to an essential characteristic of the rules designed at the national level: 
the relative freedom that is provided to provinces to implement national policies within their 
administrative boundaries. It is linked to a long Vietnamese historical tradition of provincial 
autonomy (Grossheim, 2004), which has been reinforced by the recent decentralisation process that 
accompanied the ðổi Mới (“renovation”), the process of economic liberalisation initiated in 1986. 
The devolution of power has been uneven. On the one hand, decentralisation has been restricted to the 
delegation of administrative tasks and has not encompassed the devolution of decision-making power 
(Dupar and Badenoch, 2002), thus taking the form of deconcentration. On the other hand, Vietnam 
government is often described as weak (Fforde, 1997 in McCarty, 2002). Central authorities have a 
limited ability to impose their will upon lower levels and there is great room for interpretation of 
central laws at the provincial level (Dupar and Badenoch, 2002; McCarty, 2002) and for negotiation 
at the local level (Kerkvliet, 2003; Sikor, 2004). There might also be a deliberate will from the central 
state to accommodate local interests. The land policy area accounts for the largest number of reported 
“fence-breaking8” incidents in the daily newspapers between 1990 and 2000 (Malesky, 2004). For 
instance, disparities in FLA have ranged from deliberately slow implementation, slight adaptations, 
and amendments – e.g. Son La Province amended the 1993 Land Law in 1994 (Decision No. 109/QD-
UB) to allocate land to communities rather than to households – to non implementation – e.g. Hoa 
Binh Province has not implemented Decree 163/1999 yet). The Party ‘closes its eyes’ as long as it 
does not clash with its strategic orientations. When it does, some provinces have been sanctioned. 
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 The state investment funds that concern production forest are only for the establishment of “forest with rare 
and precious tree species with a production cycle of 30 years or more” (Prime Minister of Government of 
Vietnam, 1999)  
8
 Fence-breaking is used here to describe acts of autonomy (Malesky, 2004). 
Yet, some provincial initiatives that were initially criticised have since been taken as models and have 
led to a law revision9 (Malesky, 2004). 
(b) The actors 
Actors can simultaneously be involved in several institutional arenas. A cadre from the Provincial 
People’s Committee (PPC) might also be a member of the Central Communist Party and thus acts 
both at the collective-choice and constitutional level in his province and at the national level. Table 2 
clarifies which actors intervene at which institutional level during policy-implementation. 
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 For example, the use of land-use certificates as collateral for bank loans by private companies in a few 
provinces was first criticised by the central government but then integrated in the Land Law of 1999 (Malesky, 
2004). 
Table 2. Legal actors involved in rules implementation at the three institutional levels10 
 
Institutional level 
Actors Operational 
situation 
Collective-choice situation Constitutional 
situation 
Geographic 
area 
Central government 
(Prime minister, 
ministries and other 
state agencies)  
 De jure: Designs 
implementing decrees, 
resolutions, decisions, 
directives, circulars 
De facto: Also designs laws 
De facto: Decides on 
who implements and 
how are implemented 
legal documents (e.g. 
defines the degree of 
freedom that 
provincial authorities 
have to implement) 
National 
Provincial cell of the 
Communist Partya / 
Provincial People’s 
Council / Provincial 
People’s Committee 
(PPC) 
 The PPC implements rules 
for forest and land 
management (e.g. classifies 
land and allocates protection 
forest and forestry land) 
Decide provincial 
resolutions and 
directives on how 
policies are 
implemented and 
which department 
implements them 
Province 
Provincial technical 
Departments  
 Control and enforce land use 
regulations  
Supervise the 
implementation of 
provincial guidelines 
Province 
District People’s 
Committee and 
technical 
Departments 
 The District People’s 
Committee implements rules 
for forest and land 
management (e.g. allocates 
production forest and 
forestry land). Control and 
enforce land use regulations 
Implement the 
provincial guidelines 
with relative freedom 
District 
Commune People’s 
Committee 
 Implements the district 
guidelines with relative 
freedom. Control and 
enforce land use regulations 
 Commune 
SFEs Might implement national 
guidelines on special-use 
forests and FLA 
 
Communities / 
Households / 
Individuals 
Forest and land use 
(e.g. forest 
plantation, 
protection, 
enrichment, 
exploitation and 
processing) 
Might craft their own 
community rules 
Might define who 
crafts and how 
community rules are 
crafted 
Owned area 
 
Notes: a. The Communist Party is not formally part of the State’s legal system but has still a central role in 
the political and legal life of Vietnam. It designs the national strategic orientations and guidelines for the 
government to follow, and appraises policies. For instance, the Doi Moi policy, which is considered as the most 
important political-economic reform of the last decades in Vietnam, stems from a resolution of the Party 
National Congress. 
b. The People’s Council and Committee are officially the legislative and executive bodies at the province, 
district, commune levels. Yet, as underlined in Shanks et al. (2004), power is unevenly balanced between these 
two organisations to the benefit of the People’s Committee, which holds both budgetary and administrative 
power. 
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 These actors are grouped according to their official administrative tasks, but as developed later in the 
paper, it does not imply that they have congruent preferences and pursue similar objectives. 
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Responsibilities for forest management are divided in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MARD) between the Forest Protection Department (FPD) and the Forestry Department 
(FD). Land management (land administration) is placed under the authority of the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and the Environment (MONRE). 
At the provincial level, the Party and the People’s Committee issue guidelines defining the 
implementation of national decisions in their territory. The provincial departments are the executing 
arms of the Provincial People’s Committee (PPC). They are in charge of “state management” which 
means that they apply policies and control their implementation. They delegate most implementation 
to and coordinate the actions of the district authorities in the field. Lastly, they also have a role as 
advisor and knowledge base to the PPC.  
The provincial Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) is more particularly in 
charge of forestry planning. At the provincial level, the FD is a sub-department of the DARD and is 
responsible for the implementation of the 5MHRP, coordinating local programme management 
committees at the district level and controlling the implementation of the programme by State Forest 
Enterprises (SFEs). Although the FPD is a Department of the MARD at the central level, it is often 
located directly under the authority of the PPC, and has thus a position equivalent to the DARD at the 
provincial level. The provincial FPD supervises the actions of local forest protection officers who are 
in charge of forest protection on the field. In some provinces, it has been in charge of FLA. The FPD 
has recently been entitled the task of forest monitoring and evaluation. It receives and compiles the 
changes in forest reported by all forest owners at the local level. The Department of Natural 
Resources and Environment (DONRE) is in charge of land planning and administration (e.g. issuing 
land certificates). It has also been in charge of implementing land allocation in some provinces. The 
provincial departments are de jure accountable both to the PPC (for human resources and budget) and 
to the Ministry (for technical aspects). De facto they are much more accountable to the PPC as the 
latter decides on budget, recruitment and individual promotion. Districts and communes act as the 
policy implementers on the ground and have in practice relative freedom for adapting and negotiating 
policies with local people (Kerkvliet, 2004). 
Actors responsible for forest management at the operational level are multiple. Although this study 
focuses on how decisions taken at the provincial level have impacted on household decisions and 
livelihoods, it is important to consider the role of SFEs. Presently the largest recipient for forestry 
land-use rights in Vietnam (Nguyen Quang Tan, 2006), they still control most of the forestry land 
area1. The activities of these organisations have dramatically changed over the last 10 years. First 
established by the socialist State as logging companies, their management was then decentralised 
from the central government to provincial and district authorities in 1991. From 1994, their economic 
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 In 2005, according to the MARD database, 362 SFEs still controlled 40 per cent of forestry land in 
Vietnam (Rural Development & Natural Resources East Asia & Pacific Region (EASRD), 2005). 
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activities have been seriously affected by the logging ban of natural forest. Since 1997, a reform has 
been initiated to transform them into commercially viable and autonomous business units. Because of 
the slow pace of the reform process, privatisation was further reaffirmed in 2004 (Decree 
200/2004/ND-CP). Non-viable SFEs should either be dissolved or transformed into a Protection 
Forest State Management Board. SFEs currently act as implementing units of the 5MHRP by 
contracting with households for forest protection, regeneration and plantation. They also provide 
farmers with seedlings.  
According to the law, every household is entitled to receive land-use rights as long as it has the 
human and financial capacity to use land according to state regulations (GoV, 1999). In practice, 
because of the discretionary power of local authorities, the implementation of FLA has often been 
captured by the local elite (Sowerwine, 2004). To receive land, a household must make a request to 
commune authorities who then pass on the request to the district people’s committee that will make 
the final decision. In practice, land allocation has often been implemented with little participation of 
villagers. In the past, many households refused to claim land because they feared higher taxes and did 
not see the benefits of receiving land-use rights for land that they had been using freely for 
generations (Clement and Amezaga, 2008). Most land allocated to households is barren land, land 
with forest cover still under the control of SFEs (Sikor and Tran Ngoc Thanh, 2007). 
4) The 5MHRP: reforesting, but for whom and for what? 
(a) Prominent outcomes 
(i) Smallholder forestry 
Although the forestry sector was of critical economic importance during the war, today it only 
contributes around one per cent of the Gross Domestic Product2 (MARD, 2005). However, the wood 
processing industry in Vietnam is undergoing a dynamic expansion, national timber needs being 
largely covered by importations (Barney, 2005). Despite of a strong domestic demand for timber, our 
interviews and previous scientific studies (Fortech, 1998; Roda and Rathi, 2005) highlighted 
difficulties in strengthening the role of timber production in the national economy and as a financially 
viable option for farmers3.  
The 5MHRP has provided few incentives to make forestry an attractive option for farmers and 
thus to impact on the incomes of the poor (Dinh Duc Thuan, 2005). Surprisingly, the 5MHRP 
investment funds have indeed been almost exclusively directed to protection forest where 
establishment and exploitation have to follow strict state planning schemes. Loans for production 
                                                     
2
 Its economic importance might nonetheless be substantial in some provinces, for instance in Central 
Vietnam where large SFEs are engaged in timber trade with Laos. 
3
 Difficulties mentioned are the low productivity of plantations and the high transportation costs due to tree 
plantation scattering and low accessibility. 
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forest are in practice difficult to access for most farmers (MARD and 5MHRP Partnership Secretariat, 
2001) and their interest rate is too high to provide sufficient economic incentives (DARD Thai 
Nguyen, 2006). The poor capacity of the 5MHRP to foster smallholder tree plantations and improve 
livelihoods has been acknowledged in several studies (Ohlsson et al., 2005; Clement and Amezaga, 
2008) and was openly recognised by the authorities of Thai Nguyen Province, who have decided to 
develop their own afforestation scheme, specifically directed to households, in parallel to the 
5MHRP.  
(ii) Forestry land classification 
Forestry land classification is not a recent policy decision, but its implementation is still on-going. 
It has notably been boosted by the 5MHRP, which requires that a plan for land use shall be 
established for open land and bare hills and that the new forests are equally balanced between special-
use, protection and production forests (Prime Minister of the Government of Vietnam, 1998).  
According to interviews with provincial officers, the area of land classified as protection forestry 
land has significantly increased for the last decade, under the implementation of the Programme 327 
and then under the 5MHRP. This has been confirmed by national figures (Table 3) and official 
statements (Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of Vietnam, 2005). The area of protection 
forestry land reported by local authorities to the MARD reached over 9 million ha in 2005, far beyond 
the 6 million ha that had been planned by the government in the National Forestry Development 
Strategy 2001-20104. 
 
Table 3. Evolution of the land area classified under the three categories of forestry land  
Category of forestry 
land 
Area in million hectares (ha) 
in 1999a 
Area in million hectares (ha) 
in 2005b 
Special-use forestry land 0.9 2.4 
Protection forestry land 5.7 9.5 
Production forestry land 12.4 7.1 
Total forestry land 19.0 19.0 
Sources: 
a. Nguyen Xuan Nguyen et al., 1999 
b. FPD, 2007 on www.kiemlam.org.vn 
 
The increase of protection forestry land has several important social and economic implications. On 
the one hand, it decreases the area of land available for crop cultivation, grazing or, if forested, timber 
exploitation (Dinh Duc Thuan, 2005). On the other hand, it increases the area under state control. The 
conjunction of both factors (decreased land area for economic production and inadequate means of 
control) has favoured corruption and activities now considered illegal. 
                                                     
4
 Recently, the Government of Vietnam asked provinces to convert back protection forestry land to 
production forestry land. This shift was reflected in the National Forestry Strategy 2006-2020 (Prime Minister 
of the Government of Vietnam, 2007, p. 57). The less critical sub-category of the protection forestry land 
(around 3 million ha) will be converted into production forestry land. 
   
 17 
(b) Linking outcomes with external variables 
Having reviewed the major outcomes of the 5MHRP, we now examine: 1) to which extent these 
outcomes have been linked to decisions taken by provincial authorities; 2) which range of incentives, 
interests and beliefs has influenced the latter, and; 3) how external variables have affected the 
interests and beliefs of provincial bureaucrats. 
(i) Politico-economic context 
One can wonder why the 5MHRP has such a marked focus on protection forest whilst defined 
objectives for new plantations in Decision 661 entail 60 per cent for production/industrial forest. In 
the context of a strong government commitment to economic development and an increasing need for 
timber, one would expect the state support to be focused on developing forestry. Our findings suggest 
that the state has actually supported the forestry sector under the 5MHRP. Yet, it has not been 
achieved by fostering household economy, but by helping SFEs to survive.  
During fieldwork in Hoa Binh Province, an officer of the Luong Son District FPD unit reported 
that “in 2004, the government decided to extend some of the protection forestry land to protect water 
springs.” As suggested in the previous section, doubts can be raised about the extent to which 
environmental concern has driven the increase of protection forestry land. Beyond environmentally-
oriented discourses lies a range of political and economic interests. Part of the 5MHRP state funding 
goes to SFEs to cover the programme administration costs. Many SFEs, which are now supposed to 
run as autonomous businesses, lack capital (Rural Development & Natural Resources East Asia & 
Pacific Region (EASRD), 2005) and rely on the 5MHRP funds to survive (source: interviews, 2006). 
Because the 5MHRP state funds are directed to protection forest and forestry land, a MARD cadre 
acknowledged that during the Programme 327: “provinces increased protection forest to benefit from 
state budget.” According to interviewed donors and NGOs, the same reason prevailed under the 
5MHRP: provinces have increased the protection forestry land area to receive more state funds (see 
also Nguyen Xuan Nguyen et al., 1999; MARD (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development) and 
5MHRP Partnership Secretariat, 2001; De Jong et al., 2006). It was also officially acknowledged by 
the Deputy Prime Minister at a review workshop on the 5MHRP held in Hanoi (2005). 
The fact that a MARD official recognised that under the Programme 327 provinces had increased 
protection forestry land area to receive state funds suggests that the government was already aware of 
this bias by the time the 5MHRP was designed. However, by allocating all funds to protection forest, 
the government unambiguously encouraged the same process under the 5MHRP. There are indeed 
several strong political and economic interests that suggest that it was a deliberate decision. First, the 
increase of protection forestry land enables the state to keep control of forestry activities and forestry 
land under state-linked organisations. Second, it is in the interest of central and provincial authorities 
to help SFEs to survive. SFEs form an important employer in several provinces and still retain 
significant areas of forestry land. Furthermore, there is a tight relationship between the forestry sector 
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and the policy arena at the provincial and national level. Forestry was a substantial source of revenues 
for the Communist Party in the Southern and Central provinces of Vietnam (Bangkok Post 1993 in 
McElwee, 2004). Because many senior provincial and national cadres come from the forestry sector, 
foresters are still influential in the policy arena. Predominant drivers for the increase in protection 
forestry land area lie in the politico-economic context. Yet, we argue that the politico-economic 
context was significant precisely because the rules-in-use designed at the central level have provided 
further incentives for provincial actors to pursue their interests. 
(ii) Rules-in-use 
Centrally-designed rules have encouraged the bias in forestry land classification and state funds 
diversion in several ways. First, the rules on land classification lack clarity and consistency 
(Sowerwine, 2004; Ohlsson et al., 2005). The classification under the three categories remains 
controversial (MARD, 2000; MARD and 5MHRP Partnership Secretariat, 2001), and the criteria for 
land classification and the boundaries between protection and production forest are unclear. This lack 
of clarity was reinforced by the fact that definitions have greatly changed over the past 10 years. 
Second, SFEs are by law autonomous business units but they have been nonetheless also entitled by 
the same law (Decree 200/2004/ND-CP) to keep up to 5000 ha of protection forest, which induces the 
possibility to mix public service and private business activities. Lastly, there has been a lack of 
monitoring on the 5MHRP implementation by the central level. The recent state audit on the 5MHRP 
reported malversations of civil servants and state organisations resulting in a misappropriation of the 
programme investment funds amounting to 135 billion Dong5 (VND) (Cong An Nhan Dan (Công An 
Nhân Dân) (People's Police) newspaper, 2007).  
(iii) Discourses  
Blurred discourses have also facilitated the arbitrary implementation of blurred rules on forest 
classification. There is some “fuzziness” in official communications around what is the major focus of 
the 5MHRP. For instance, although the first stated goal in Decision 661 is environmental protection, a 
study recently published by the MARD says: “compared with the previous 327 program which mainly 
focused on protection forest, the 661 project considered timber production from plantations as the 
major strategy of the afforestation” (Dinh Duc Thuan, 2005). In public discourses, the environmental 
function of production forest comes first, prior to production objectives: “Plantation of the production 
forest is to contribute to the environmental and ecological protection while increasing incomes of 
those relying on forestry activities” (Prime Minister of the Government of Vietnam, 2007a).  
 
What is more, the difference between the characteristics of protection and production forest is not 
clear, as illustrated by this quote from a senior official from the Forestry Department of the MARD: 
                                                     
5
 This is equivalent to approximately 6.6 million Euros / 8.7 million USD. 
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“Production forest is also protection forest. All forests can play this role” (source: interview, 2006). 
Interestingly, the opposite, i.e. the fact that protection forest can fulfil productive purposes is far less 
clear in discourses. But a close scrutiny of Decision 661 indicates that the characteristics defined for 
protection forest do not necessarily meet requirements for the provision of environmental services. In 
Decision 661, technical guidelines for watershed protection forests specify: “in the areas where the 
conditions so permit, the use of species with high economic value should be encouraged” (Prime 
Minister of the Government of Vietnam, 1998, Article 4). Most planted tree species under the 
5MHRP are indeed fast-growing trees adapted to the needs of the pulp and paper industry, of which 
actual contribution to watershed protection is questionable. In one province, a cadre from the Forestry 
Department explained:  
Before 2003, we were planting Chukrasia Tabularis and teak (Tectona grandis). Since 
2004, we have replaced them by acacia, pine and eucalyptus for economic reasons. For 
Chukrasia tabularis, we need to wait for 30-50 years to exploit, for pine it is only 15 years. 
After the 15th year, pine trees give resin and wood for pulp. 
 
It would be simplistic and only partly true to conclude that central policy-makers have purposely 
mixed environmental and economic goals in their discourses to pursue vested interests. Genuine 
environmental concerns have also guided the formulation of forest policies in Vietnam. But forest is 
imagined and depicted by policy-makers as an environmental panacea, a universal remedy against 
landslides, floods and water shortages. Although forests do provide environmental benefits, some 
links between forests and hydrology have been exaggerated and highly depend on sites and tree 
species (e.g. Calder, 1998; Bruijnzeel et al., 2005). However, oversimplified narratives on forests and 
floods or forests and water flows are still vivid on the international scene and in Vietnam (e.g. MARD 
and 5MHRP Secretariat, 2001, p. 4). In Vietnam, afforestation efforts have aimed at establishing a 
“green cover”6, regardless of tree species and forest quality. The need for re-greening what are called 
barren hills still holds; for instance, a senior staff of a Vietnamese research institute commented forest 
increase in Vietnam stating: “The quality of forest is poor but it is very green” (source: interview, 
2006). The first objectives of the 5MHRP recently re-stated by the Deputy Prime Minister in a 
workshop were “speed up forest plantation; re-green bare land” (Deputy Prime Minister of the 
Government of Vietnam, 2005). At the provincial level, the same narrative also prevails, as illustrated 
by this quote from a senior cadre of the sub-Department of Forestry of one visited province “from 
2004, we have planted acacias, pines and eucalyptus saplings; with these, it is very easy to cover the 
land” (source: interview, 2006). 
                                                     
6
 The goal of covering the land is explicit in the name of the Program 327: “Greening the barren hills”. 
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5) Forestry land allocation and land use 
(a) Prominent outcomes 
(i) Impact on land management 
Before FLA, people in the northern uplands of Vietnam usually practiced different forms of 
shifting cultivation, including nomadic cultivation. For national policy-makers, FLA aimed to fix 
cultivation, to encourage swiddeners to adopt “more sustainable” (or more intensive) land-use 
practices, and thereby to halt deforestation. As intended, FLA, combined with settlement policies, has 
significantly hindered shifting land-use systems. Once land was allocated, it was not possible to open 
up new fields and the small size of individual plots did not usually enable crop fallowing. But the 
move to fixed cultivation and land management under individual property rights also caused a range 
of unintended consequences, including nutrient depletion (Mellac, 2000; Nguyen Thanh Lam et al., 
2004; Castella et al., 2006; Jakobsen et al., 2007), the disruption of  collective land-use systems 
(Clement and Amezaga, 2008), conflicts over Non Timber Forest Products (NTFPs) and grazing land 
(Gomiero et al., 2000; Hager, 2006). Although FLA might have had positive effects, individual 
property rights has been observed in many instances to be ill-adapted to upland biophysical conditions 
and cultural characteristics (Do Dinh Sam, 1994; Castella et al., 2002; Dupar and Badenoch, 2002).  
The recent legal recognition of community forestry in the revision of the Land Law (2003) and the 
Law on Forest Protection and Development (2004) is a remarkable shift in the institutional framework 
for forest and land management. However, according to interviewed consultants and donors in Hanoi 
involved in forestry at the national level, few provinces have officially recognised the rights of 
communities to manage valuable forest. Visited provinces exhibit disparities in their application of 
Community Based Forest Management (CBFM). Son La Province was an exception in its early FLA 
to communities in 1994-19967. It has today allocated a relatively high proportion of forestry land to 
communities compared to other visited provinces (Table 1). But, when commenting FLA figures, the 
Deputy Director of Son La FPD specified: “We allocated land to communities because we didn’t have 
time to create a management committee to allocate to groups of households, but it will change.” 
“Community” has often actually meant the Commune People’s Committee. The underlying rationales 
and incentives that have influenced the provinces’ decisions to support community forestry are 
explored in the next section.  
(ii) Impact on afforestation 
There has not been any comprehensive national study assessing the impact of FLA on afforestation 
so far. However, several sources of evidence suggest that FLA has had little impact on households’ 
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 FLA to communities was however limited to seven communes of Yen Chau District. 
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decisions to plant trees, including interviews with provincial authorities, several local level studies8  
(Sikor, 2001; Dinh Duc Thuan, 2005; Sunderlin and Huynh Thu Ba, 2005; Castella et al., 2006) and 
spatial analyses (Meyfroidt and Lambin, 2008; Clement et al., In preparation). 
(b) Linking outcomes with external variables 
(i) FLA and land management 
As depicted previously, the unintended outcomes of FLA to households on land-use systems are 
rooted in its poor suitability to upland biophysical conditions and its incompatibility with land-use 
systems managed under collective rules-in-use. The roots for the shortcomings of FLA to households 
in respect to land management outcomes are thus related to policy design rather than policy 
implementation and are outside the scope of this paper. We will focus instead on the implementation 
of CBFM, recently encouraged by the central government through the recognition of communities as 
legal recipients of land-use rights in the 2003 Land Law and 2004 FPD Law.  
Son La Province was far ahead these recent decisions of the central government when allocating 
land-use rights to villages in 1994-1996. Though it is not possible to ascertain which factors drove 
this decision of Son La People’s Committee, we can nonetheless identify the main interests and 
incentives that might have pushed it forward. According to Sikor (2004), there was a real concern in 
the mid 1990s among Son La Province’s authorities on deforestation and more specifically on the 
related risks of sedimentation in the reservoir feeding the hydro-electric dam of Hoa Binh9, located 
downstream. According to our interview with the FPD deputy director, FLA was indeed the rational 
solution to deforestation: “Before forests didn’t have owners, it was a public good that belonged to 
the state, thus people destroyed it. This is why we decided to allocate forest and forestry land”. The 
choice of allocating land to “communities” rather than to households was also justified by 
environmental arguments: “If we devolve land-use rights to the community, its awareness is raised. 
Forest is a public good so an individual does not damage it. Furthermore, villages have rules to 
protect the forest.” Finally, from 2000 the German development agency Gesellschaft für Technische 
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 Contrary to this assertion, the socio-economic assessment report of Bai Bang paper mill, commanded by 
the Swedish International Development cooperation Agency (SIDA), argues that FLA has provided strong 
incentives to farmers of the Bai Bang mill neighbouring areas to engage in forestry. It recognises however that 
afforestation would probably not have sustained without the unique commercial opportunities offered by the 
proximity of the mill (Blower et al., 1999, p.158). 
9
 This is the largest dam in Vietnam and still today provides a significant part of the electricity to the 
country. Because of a high sedimentation rate in the reservoir, the life expectancy of the dam was threatened to 
be reduced from an estimated range of 100-300 years to 50 years (Poffenberger and Nguyen, 1998) 
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Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) played a great role in expanding and further developing the “experiment” 
initiated by the Province People’s Committee with the Song Da River Project10.  
Behind these rational arguments lie also bureaucratic and economic interests. For provincial 
authorities, land allocation to local communities eases the overwhelming and costly process of 
allocating land parcels to individual households. As explained by the FPD in one visited province: “It 
is easier to allocate land to communities. We only discuss with the head of the village, no need to 
discuss with all villagers”. Bureaucratic or economic reasons are not less valuable than ideological 
ones, but they are likely to lead to distinct outcomes as objectives of administrative efficiency or 
reduction in state budget expenses become prominent over sustainable resource management and 
livelihood improvement. For instances, when the rationale for CBFM is based on administrative 
factors, no matter whether land-property rights are actually devolved to groups of households or 
transferred to the Commune People’s Committee. 
As in the case of the 5MHRP, the ability of the provincial administration to pursue their interests 
has been allowed and facilitated by centrally designed rules. Firstly, the revised FPD Law is unclear 
on the legal rights of communities. Although it includes a section on forest allocation to village 
communities, communities are not recognised as legal forest owners (Articles 3 and 5 in National 
Assembly of Vietnam, 2004). Secondly, the allocation of forest and land to communities is not really 
encouraged: it is recommended either when forest is already managed or used “efficiently” by the 
community or when forest “cannot be assigned to organisations, households or individuals” (Article 
29 in National Assembly of Vietnam, 2004). It tacitly suggests that the allocation of forest to 
households is preferable to the allocation to communities.  
Discourse analysis confirms that the benefits and pertinence of CBFM is actually unclear in the 
policy-making arena. Most respondents at the provincial and central level depicted CBFM as “good” 
– generally meaning “fostering or enabling forest protection”. However, interviews indicate that this 
belief rather comes from the conformance to politically correct discourse than to a genuine 
conviction. No respondents specified why or under which conditions community forestry might be 
suitable. There was also often in the discussion a general confusion between open-access and 
common-property regimes. For instance, shortly after asserting that community forestry was “good”, 
a forestry expert working for a cooperation agency stated: “Before land allocation, forest was owned 
by many people at the same time, and thus was destroyed” (source: interview, 2006), thereby 
sustaining Hardin’s view of the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968). Lastly, the rationale for 
CBFM most often quoted by respondents is that CBFM is a “traditional way of land management”. 
However, the traditional character of a practice per se does not guarantee sustainability, equity or 
efficiency.  
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 This project ran from 1990 to 2004 and led to the experimentation of pilot community forestry schemes in 
3000 villages of Son La Province. 
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As suggested previously, CBFM certainly holds many assets which suit particular conditions of 
the uplands. But its use as a black-box concept is problematic. First, because the suitability of CBFM 
for forest protection requires an examination of local institutions, culture and biophysical conditions 
(Thomson and Schoonmaker Freudenberger, 1997; Gibson et al., 2000). Second, because a clear 
argumentation on CBFM benefits is necessary to change the beliefs on the ability of ethnic minority 
groups to manage forest and land which still prevail among provincial bureaucrats. 
(ii) FLA impact on afforestation  
Although the economic context is largely responsible for the lack of interest of farmers for the 
establishment of tree plantations (several studies and our interviews with provincial public servants 
stressed the difficulty for farmers in making a living from forestry under the current market 
conditions), the little impact of FLA on afforestation is also rooted in the mismatch of individual 
property rights with upland biophysical conditions. Large upland areas – forestry land makes up as 
much as 80 per cent of the territory in the visited provinces – with low accessibility makes 
enforcement and monitoring difficult. Adding to the lack of human resources is the difficulty to make 
accurate maps, which in turn impacts not only on FLA implementation and forest cover assessment, 
but also on control and enforcement. Furthermore, these conditions affect the motivation of public 
servants to perform their tasks dutifully. Along with low salary, it results in little enthusiasm for what 
is felt to be a top-down programme with uncertain benefits. Rules for accountability are also 
determinant; commune authorities are de facto often more accountable to local people than to district 
or provincial authorities because of strong kinship ties (Sikor, 2001; Dupar and Badenoch, 2002). The 
recent increase of land area classified as protection forestry land has augmented the area officially 
under state control, accentuating the inadequacy of means for control and enforcement. But this is not 
an issue of concern for the DARD and the FD, which implement the 5MHRP and receive state funds, 
since forest protection is under the responsibility of the FPD. The implementation of the 5HMRP and 
forest protection is led by two different departments that have no incentive to collaborate.  
6) Conclusion 
To the eyes of an outsider, forest policies in Vietnam might appear relatively successful. Vietnam 
stands out in the last Global Forest Resources Assessment (FAO, 2005) as one of the few countries in 
the world where forest cover has increased more than 0.50 per cent per year between 2000 and 2005. 
Furthermore, the government’s commitment to the devolution of long term forestry land-use rights to 
households and communities has generally been touted by the international community as a 
significant step towards more effective, equitable and sustainable land management. 
However, notwithstanding that the official statistics of forest cover increase are questionable 
(Sunderlin and Huynh Thu Ba, 2005), significant discrepancies between policy intentions and 
outcomes are hidden behind these achievements: 1) the national afforestation programme, the 
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5MHRP, has not successfully involved households in the forestry sector and has not contributed to 
poverty reduction or to economic development; 2) its implementation has encouraged a bias in 
forestry land classification – namely an over-classification into the protection category; 3) Forestry 
land allocation (FLA) to households has often disrupted existing land-use systems, leading to 
unintended outcomes; 4) there is a great disparity in how community-based management has been 
implemented among provinces, and; 5) FLA has hitherto had little impact on afforestation. Multiple 
roots for these discrepancies have been identified: 
The poor success of the 5MHRP in contributing to poor household incomes in northern uplands is 
of course strongly related to the current economic and market conditions. But the incentives – or 
rather the lack of incentives – provided by the 5MHRP to involve households in the forestry sector 
have also been essential. Like its predecessor Programme 327, the programme has deliberately 
focused on protection and special-use forest and central subsidies have been exclusively directed to 
the provincial forest administration and State Forest Enterprise (SFEs).  
Although the interest of provincial authorities to increase protection forestry land have been 
related to the political-economic context (the need to support SFEs in the current reform context), the 
bias in land classification has been allowed and even encouraged by centrally defined rules, namely 
the rules for central budget allocation and an unclear definition of forest categories. It has been further 
facilitated by unclear discourses from the Party-State. These discourses have been ambiguous on the 
actual objectives of the 5MHRP, promoting afforestation as a goal per se, and have been equivocal 
about the characteristics of the protection and production forest and land categories.  
The negative outcomes of FLA to households on land management primarily stem from its 
unsuitability with the biophysical characteristics of upland areas and the customary collective rules-
in-use. The underlying drivers for these outcomes thus rather arise from the design of FLA than its 
implementation. The legal recognition of CBFM might be a promising opening towards a higher 
diversity of institutional arrangements and a greater adaptation to local conditions. However, this 
promise might not yield expected outcomes. On the one hand, its execution might have been largely 
driven by bureaucratic and economic interests. Provincial authorities have seen CBFM as a means to 
speed up the overwhelming land allocation process to households. On the other hand, the FPD Law  
and public discourses have not really encouraged its application by providing a clear rationale on its 
benefits. Like afforestation, CBFM has been black-boxed and promoted as inherently good. This lack 
of clarity does not favour a sound adaptation of institutional arrangements to local conditions. Nor 
does it help dismissing prevailing beliefs on the ability of local people to organise themselves to 
manage land sustainably. 
Lastly, the limited impact of FLA to households on afforestation is largely related with the low 
attractiveness of forestry and the biophysical characteristics of upland areas. The low accessibility and 
large extent of forestry land have greatly hindered law enforcement over land use. The increase of the 
protection forestry land area has accentuated the inadequacy between the task and the capacity of 
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forest protection officers to enforce state regulations. This problem results to some extent from the 
lack of co-operation between the two provincial departments in charge of land classification and 
forest protection. 
Therefore, though the decisions taken by provincial bureaucrats have greatly contributed to the 
gaps between intentions and outcomes regarding forest and land policies in Vietnam, these decisions 
have been allowed or encouraged by the rules designed by the central government and discourses 
stemming from the Party-State at the central level. The general or vague feature of many legal 
documents in Vietnam permits certain flexibility in policy interpretation and implementation at lower 
governance levels. On the one hand, it allows policies to be adapted to local specificities, different 
“policy models11” to be tested and eventually new lessons for policy improvements to arise. On the 
other hand, the “policy models” created at the provincial or lower level are not necessarily based on 
sound arguments, i.e. on a will to improve policies or make these better fit to the local context. For 
better models to arise, flexibility must be linked with responsibility and control by increasing the 
accountability of the provincial departments to the Ministries, and implementing reliable policy 
monitoring and evaluation systems. It is noteworthy that the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MARD) stands out as one of the leading ministries moving forward along this 
direction by its commitment to monitor and evaluate all new policies (source: interviews, 2006).  
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